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have	 been	 able	 to	 turn	 their	 business	 prowess	 into	 power-
ful	political	 influence,	have	been	among	the	most	 important	
actors	 in	 Ukraine’s	 politics.	 More	 than	 two	 years	 after	 the	







•	 The	 oligarchs	 have	 been	 able	 to	 hold	 on	 to	 their	 influence	
in	 politics	 and	 the	 economy	 thanks	 to	 a	 number	 of	 factors,	
among	which	 two	are	particularly	 important:	 the	weakness	
of	the	government	in	Kyiv,	which	is	preoccupied	with	the	war	
in	defence	of	 the	 country’s	 territorial	 integrity,	 and	 the	 fact	
that	the	oligarchic	groups	still	possess	powerful	instruments	










persists	despite	 the	 fact	 that	Volodymyr	Groysman,	 the	new	
prime	minister	 appointed	 in	mid-April	 2016,	has	 close	 links	
to	 the	 president’s	 camp.	 However,	 this	 is	 a	 purely	 tactical	
and	 therefore	 impermanent	alignment,	 founded	on	 the	cur-
rent	needs	of	the	two	sides.	The	lesson	from	the	last	dozen	or	




















in	 parallel,	 new	 political-business	 groups	 have	 started	 to	
emerge	around	 the	Ukrainian	 leadership,	which	can	also	be	
termed	‘oligarchic’.	Thanks	to	their	close	links	to	the	highest-
ranking	 leaders	 of	 Ukraine,	 members	 of	 these	 groups	 have	
taken	 control	 over	many	 important	 state-owned	 companies	




ness	 assets	 controlled	 by	 any	 given	 party.	 This	 mechanism	










•	 The	existence	of	 the	oligarchic	groups,	 formed	as	a	result	of	
a	pathological	symbiosis	between	power	and	big	business,	re-




























the	 shortcomings	of	 the	Ukrainian	state.	The	 success	of	 any	




















of	 the	 1990s	has	demonstrated	 extraordinary	vitality	 and	 resil-
ience,	as	well	as	a	capacity	to	adapt	to	changing	political	circum-
stances.	 Irrespective	 of	 who	 is	 in	 power	 in	 Kyiv,	 the	 oligarchs	
invariably	retain	their	status	as	key	political	players.	In	no	oth-







constant,	 whether	 it	 is	 the	 ancient	 world,	 certain	 modern-era	
Western	European	states,	the	Polish-Lithuanian	Commonwealth,	
or	 Ukraine	 since	 1991.	 According	 to	 Professor	 Antoni	 Mączak,	
a	 distinguished	 Polish	 historian	who	 studied	 the	 phenomenon,	
oligarchy	is	primarily	a	system	of	state	governance.2	In	an	oligar-
chic	system,	an	informal	and	limited	group	(or	groups)	operates	
whose	members,	 the	 oligarchs,	 have	 created	networks	 of	 inter-
dependencies.	 Within	 those	 networks,	 they	 provide	 patronage	
and	 protection	 to	 their	 clients	 (politicians,	 communities,	 par-
ties,	etc.)	in	return	for	loyalty	and	for	promoting	their	interests.	
As	 a	 result,	 whole	 pyramids	 of	 interdependencies	 form	within	
a	state	(at	both	the	central	and	the	local	 levels),	which	resemble	
1	 K.	Całus,	Moldova:	 from	oligarchic	pluralism	 to	Plahotniuc’s	hegemony,	




er	are	Klientela. Nieformalne systemy władzy w Polsce i w Europie XVI-XVIII w.	
[Clientele.	Informal	systems	of	power	in	Poland	and	in	Europe	in	the	16th	to	























in	 capturing	 and	 describing	 the	 phenomenon,	 which	 combines	
political	 as	well	 strictly	economic	and	financial	 elements.	A	 re-
searcher	studying	oligarchy	 is	often	 forced	 to	rely	on	presump-
tions	 rather	 than	hard	 facts.	However,	without	unravelling	 the	
















ests,	 resembles	 the	methods	employed	 in	 the	past,	proving	 that	
the	pathological	mechanisms	 in	Ukrainian	politics	are	 far	 from	
having	been	eradicated.	The	beneficiaries	of	this	process	will	be	


















In	 the	conclusion,	 this	paper	will	 try	 to	answer	 the	question	of	
why	de-oligarchisation,	which	has	been	called	for	and	promised	
on	many	occasions,	has	not	happened	in	Ukraine.	The	author’s	ob-

























I. OlIgARChS IN The SYSTeM Of pOST-MAIDAN 
UkRAINe
1. The ‘old’ oligarchs (temporarily) on the defensive 




of	 the	key	mechanisms	safeguarding	 the	 specifically	Ukrainian	
type	of	political	pluralism.4	The	most	important	oligarchic	struc-
tures	prior	to	2014	included:




•	 the group of Rinat Akhmetov,	 the	richest	man	 in	Ukraine	
and	until	recently	the	most	powerful	oligarch	whose	influence	
extended	 into	various	 sectors	 of	 the	 economy,	 ranging	 from	
energy	(DTEK),	metallurgy	and	the	coal	industry	(Metinvest),	
to	the	financial	sector	(PUMB	bank),	the	media	(the	Ukraina	
channel,	 one	 of	 the	 largest	 television	 stations	 in	 Ukraine),	
the	 agricultural	 sector	 (HarvEast)	 and	 telecommunications	
(Ukrtelecom);

























•	 the group of Ihor kolomoyskyi,	one	of	Ukraine’s	most	pow-
erful	oligarchic	groups	since	 the	 1990s,	active	mainly	 in	 the	
finance	sector	 (PrivatBank,	Ukraine’s	 largest	financial	 insti-
tution),	 the	 energy	 sector	 (Ukrnafta,	 the	main	player	 in	 the	




completely	 lost	 its	significance	 in	the	Ukrainian	oligarchic	sys-
tem	as	 its	 leading	members	 (including	 the	Yanukovych	 family,	
the	 former	 deputy	 prime	minister	 Serhiy	Arbuzov,	 the	 former	
energy	 minister	 Eduard	 Stavitsky	 and	 their	 associate	 Serhiy	
Kurchenko)	fled	 to	Russia.	At	 the	 same	 time	 Ihor	Kolomoyskyi	
managed	to	expand	his	influence.	He	quickly	entered	an	al	liance	
with	the	new	government	and	in	March	2014	was	appointed	the	
governor	 of	 the	 Dnipropetrovsk	 oblast,	 his	 home	 region,	 and	
where	most	of	his	business	assets	are	located.	He	managed	to	ef-
fectively	 stabilise	 this	 strategically	 important	 region	 in	 the	di-
rect	vicinity	of	the	Donbas,	which,	combined	with	his	skilful	use	
of	 anti-Russian	 rhetoric,	 substantially	 boosted	 his	 popularity	
and	political	influence.	

































As	 a	 result,	when	 social	 and	political	mobilisation	was	high	di-
rectly	after	the	Maidan	and	the	country	was	ready	to	undertake	
painful	reforms,	the	 ‘old’	oligarchs	found	themselves	on	the	de-
fensive,	 uncertain	 about	 the	 future	 of	 their	 business	 interests.	













































The	 channels	 owned	 by	 the	 four	 oligarchs	 (Ihor	 Kolo	moyskyi,	








Ihor Kolomoyskyi – 20%
Dmytro Firtash,
Serhiy Lyovochkin – 21%
Viktor Pinchuk – 23%
Rinat Akhmetov – 13%
Petro Poroshenko < 1%
other oligarchs – 5%




















Ihor Kolomoyskyi (PRIVATBANK) – 21%
other oligarchs – 7%
Russian capital – 15%
other – 57%
Source:	National	Bank	of	Ukraine
2. Co-operation with the new government
The	parliamentary	elections	 in	October	2014,	conducted	under	
the	 restored	 2004	 constitution	 which	 weakened	 presidential	
powers	while	strengthening	the	Verkhovna Rada,	marked	a	cru-
cial	moment	in	the	oligarchs’	struggle	to	regain	political	signifi-
cance.	 Election	 campaigns	 in	Ukraine	 are	 traditionally	 among	
the	most	 expensive	 in	 Europe,	 each	 time	 costing	 hundreds	 of	
millions	 of	 dollars	 according	 to	 estimates.9	 In	 the	 conditions	
prevalent	in	Ukraine,	it	is	the	oligarchs	who	provide	most	of	the	
funding	–	a	 fact	 that	 is	one	of	 the	keys	 to	understanding	 their	
role	in	the	Ukrainian	political	system.	All	the	major	oligarchic	
groups	entered	 the	battle	 for	seats	 in	 the	new	parliament,	and	






ing	 by	 all	 Ukrainian	 parties	 ahead	 of	 the	 2012	 parliamentary	 elections	




















of	 the	 Verkhovna Rada’s	 activities	 during	much	 of	 the	 present	
term	suggests	that	Ihor	Kolomoyskyi	is	particularly	influential	
in	 Arseniy	 Yatsenyuk’s	 People’s	 Front,	 the	 Radical	 Party	 and	
the	 Revival	 party,	while	 Dmytro	 Firtash	 has	 substantial	 clout	










































Ihor Kolomoyskyi Dmytro Firtash Rinat Akhmetov no consistent influence
In	 the	 parliamentary	 elections,	 the	 ‘old’	 oligarchs	 reasserted	
their	 status	 as	 important	 ‘stakeholders’	 in	 Ukrainian	 politics,	
and	as	a	result	the	new	leadership	started	to	find	them	necessary.	
Subsequent	 developments	 demonstrated	 that	 what	 had	 hap-
pened	was	effectively	a	marriage	between	the	oligarchic	groups	

























oligarchic	 groups	were	 even	 allowed	 to	 expand	 their	 holdings;	








introduce	order	 in	 the	country,	and	 they	are	 the	chaos.”11	These	
words,	however,	were	not	followed	by	any	real	steps	to	actually	
curb	 the	 oligarchs’	 influence.	 Nevertheless,	 the	 deep	 economic	
crisis	 in	 Ukraine	 has	 caused	 serious	 problems	 for	many	 of	 the	
oligarchic	companies,	some	of	which	have	been	unable	 to	repay	
their	banking	loans.	Some	were	also	adversely	affected	after	their	





10	 A. Джумайло, Е. Хвостик, ‘Владельцы Evraz сдали кокс’,	Kommersant,	28	Au-
gust	2015,	http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2797444























failed	 to	dismantle	 the	 arrangements,	 dating	back	 to	 the	Yanu-
kovych	era,	that	had	been	generating	substantial	profits	for	some	









shares	 (with	 the	 State	 Treasury	 holding	 51%).	However,	 for	 un-




































Maidan	 leadership	 (specifically	 the	 president)	 occurred	 after	





























































is	also	 strong.	However,	 each	 time	 the	government	will	have	 to	
pay	 a	price	 for	 the	 extra	votes	by	 offering	 concrete	 concessions	




































































respective	 circles,	 as	 most	 of	 them	 are	 high-ranking	 politicians	
who	 nonetheless	 already	 held	 major	 business	 assets	 when	 they	
were	elected	to	the	Verkhovna Rada.	Tracing	their	current	business	
influence	is	possible	(albeit	only	to	some	extent)	thanks	to	report-
ing	 by	 the	 Ukrainian	 media	 and	 its	 journalistic	 investigations.	
Their	operational	model	relies	on	using	the	power	they	possess	as	













ing	 stepped	down	as	PM	 in	April	 2016,	 as	will	be	demonstrated	
below).	Given	their	modus	operandi	and	business	potential,	 it	is	
only	a	minor	simplification	to	call	these	people	the	‘new	oligarchs’.	




trusted	man	since	 they	did	military	 service	 together	 in	 the	So-
viet	 army	 in	 the	mid-1980s.	 Kononenko	 has	 been	 Poroshenko’s	
business	partner	since	1992;	for	example	he	has	served	for	many	























(next	 to	 Yuriy	 Lutsenko)	 in	 the	 Poroshenko	 Bloc’s	 parliamentary	
club,	rising	to	the	position	of	the	club’s	deputy	chair.	In	the	local	elec-
tions	in	autumn	2015	he	was	the	party’s	chief	of	election	staff.	Over	






tion.	 Kononenko	 has	 been	 influencing	 the	 energy	 sector	 through	
his	 close	 ties	 with	 Volodymyr	 Demchyshyn,	 the	 energy	 minister	
in	Yatsenyuk’s	cabinet	(who	was	replaced	by	Ihor	Nasalyk	in	April)	




of	Aivaras	Abromavičius,	 the	minister	 for	 economic	development.	
The	minister,	who	had	been	widely	regarded	as	one	of	the	main	re-




























tempts	 at	 changing	 the	 situation	 from	 within	 are	 kept	 down.”	
However,	even	those	widely	publicised	resignations	failed	to	af-
fect	Kononenko’s	 position.	 In	 early	March,	 his	 former	 assistant	
was	appointed	as	deputy	chief	of	the	State	Property	Fund,	where	
he	will	supervise	the	privatisation	of	Centrenergo,	among	other	
tasks.15	Kononenko	also	has	some	 influence	 in	 the	Security	Ser-




DTEK (Rinat Akhmetov) – 25%
ENERGOATOM (Mykola Martynenko) – 56%
UKRHIDROENERGO – 5%
CENTRENERGO (Ihor Kononenko) – 4%



























konstantin grigorishin,	 a	 Ukrainian	 entrepreneur	 with	
a	Russian	passport,	 is	 another	 oligarch	with	 very	 close	 ties	 to	
President	Poroshenko.	He	started	his	career	in	the	1990s	by	sell-
ing	metallurgic	products	to	Russia,	but	nearly	all	of	his	business	




which	 manufactures	 steam	 turbines	 for	 thermal	 and	 nuclear	
power	 plants;	 Dneprospetsstal;	 and	 the	 Ukrrichflot	 holding	
which	owns	several	river	ports.	Despite	the	crisis,	most	of	these	
companies	 have	 been	 among	 Ukraine’s	 most	 profitable	 busi-
nesses.	Grigorishin	moreover	holds	stakes	in	9	out	of	Ukraine’s	




Viktor	 Medvedchuk’s	 SDPU(u)	 party	 before	 the	 Orange	 Revo-




the	 Sevastopol	 dockyard	 (nationalised	 by	 the	 Russian	 govern-
ment	in	2015),	control	a	six-hectare	plot	in	central	Kyiv,	and	tried	
























large	 tender	 for	 the	supply	of	 transformers,	which	according	 to	




















Poroshenko	 also	has	 close	 links	 to	 another	 oligarch,	Yuriy ko-















































The	officially	 stated	reasons	concern	 the	crisis	 and	 the	unfa-
vourable	market	situation,	which	have	driven	down	the	value	
of	 Poroshenko’s	 companies,	 including	 the	 most	 prized	 one,	
Roshen	(Poroshenko	claims	that	he	could	sell	the	company	for	
US$3	billion,	while	Nestle	has	offered	him	US$1	billion,	which	
experts	 say	 is	 a	 reasonable	market	 price).	 It	was	 only	 in	 late	
2015	that	Roshen	was	put	in	a	so-called	blind	trust	with	a	West-
ern	investment	bank.	The	company	has	expanded	considerably	




cultural	products	to	the	extent	that	had	been	expected.	Юрій Косюк: «Зона 


































2. The business-political circle of Arseniy Yatsenyuk 
and the People’s Front
The	People’s	Front	emerged	from	the	general	election	in	October	




aged	 to	 negotiate	 favourable	 conditions	 for	 his	 resignation	 and	














































2009,	 Ivanchuk	became	its	 leader.	 In	 the	new	parliament,	 Ivan-
chuk,	who	 like	Kononenko	had	 been	 little	 known	 to	 the	 public	
before,	is	one	of	the	most	influential	persons.	His	duties	include	
maintaining	discipline	in	the	party	and	managing	contacts	with	






















the	 foods,	 fuels,	 agriculture	and	solar	energy	sectors.	However,	
the	value	of	these	assets	is	difficult	to	estimate.	After	the	Maidan,	
he	 started	 to	 expand	his	 influence	 into	 some	 state-owned	 com-
panies,	 including	 Ukrspirt,	 Ukraine’s	 largest	 alcohol	 manufac-



















23	 Ігор Коломойський: Мої розмови пишуть Льовочкін з Пінчуком, 
pravda.com.ua,	 5	March	 2015,	 http://www.pravda.com.ua/arti	cles	/2015/	
03/5/7060596/
24	 Герои большого спирта, glavcom.ua,	29	October	2015,	http://glavcom.ua/
publications/132247-geroi-bolshogo-spirta.html

















sector	 (Dizelnyi	 Zavod	 in	 Kryvyi	 Rih,	 Dneprovagonremstroy	
near	Dnipro	and	Interlizinvest,	one	of	Ukraine’s	largest	private	
rail	 transport	and	forwarding	companies).	His	wealth	was	es-









preserving	 the	 longstanding	 corruption	patterns	 in	 that	 huge	
company	(UZ	accounts	for	around	3%	of	Ukraine’s	GDP).	In	2015	
his	company	won	a	tender	for	the	operation	of	duty	free	shops	
in	 the	 Boryspil	 airport	 near	 Kyiv.27	 Yurushev	 also	 runs	 some	
businesses	 jointly	with	Andriy	 Ivanchuk.	The	change	of	own-
ership	 of	 Kreativ,	 one	 of	 Ukraine’s	 big	 agricultural	 and	 foods	
holdings	(which	manufactures	plant	fats	among	other	commod-
ities	 and	 holds	 around	 30,000	 hectares	 of	 land),	 was	 effected	
last	year,	probably	 in	order	to	serve	the	 interests	of	Yurushev	
and	Ivanchuk.28




(initially	 representing	 Yushchenko’s	 Our	 Ukraine,	 and	 then	
26	 Андрій Іванчук: Яценюк мені ніколи нічого не пропонував,	pravda.com.
ua,	9	February	2016,	http://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2016/02/9/7098391/
27	 A. Іванцова, Інфраструктура для олігарха Леоніда Юрушева,	 Radio	
Svo	boda,	 30	 October	 2015,	 http://www.radiosvoboda.org/content/arti-
cle/27335723.html
28	 В. Стародубцев, Друзья Яценюка становятся миллиардерами-перера-


















Rada	 committee	 for	 the	 fuels	 and	 energy	 complex	 of	Ukraine,	
one	of	the	most	important	committees	in	the	parliament.	Keep-
ing	 that	post	under	 three	 consecutive	governments	must	have	
required	considerable	political	skill,	proving	that	Martynenko	
is	 a	man	who	 can	 come	 to	 terms	with	 practically	 any	 govern-
ment.	 Since	 2011,	Martynenko	has	been	a	member	of	Yatseny-






Yanukovych-era	 corruption	mechanisms.	He	 said	 that	Mykola	
Martynenko	 was	 co-responsible	 for	 numerous	 irregularities	
and	 embezzlement	 at	 Energoatom,	 worth	 around	 €50	million.	
Gordienko	 estimated	 that	 the	 state	 budget	 had	 lost	more	 than	
7.5	billion	hryvnia	(around	US$300	million)	as	a	result,	also	also	
pointed	to	irregularities	in	other	state-owned	companies	over-











thorities	 had	 launched	 an	 investigation	 against	 Martynenko,	
























ing	 the	 investigation	 against	Martynenko.32	His	 business	 inter-
ests	 also	 extend	 to	 other	 state-owned	 companies,	 the	 largest	 of	
which	include	the	Odessa	Port	Plant,	a	giant	chemical	company,	
and	the	United	Mining	and	Chemical	Company.	How	many	com-
panies	Martynenko	 owns	 privately	 is	 not	 known.	What	 we	 do	
know	is	that	he	owns	Austria’s	Antra	GMBH,	one	of	the	main	im-
porters	of	gas	to	Ukraine,	which	supplies	gas	to	the	Odessa	Port	







Sonntag Zeitung,	 22	 March	 2015,	 http://www.sonntagszeitung.ch/read/
sz_22_03_2015/nachrichten/Chef-der-ukrainischen-Atombehoerde-soll-
in-der-Schweiz-Geld-verstecken-30868
31	 С. Мусаева-Боровик, А. Самофалов, Ядерное обогащение Николая Марты-
ненко,	pravda.com.ua,	9	November	2015,	http://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/
articles/2015/11/9/7087675/
32	 Артем Сытник: “Гарантии независимости НАБУ в законе соблюдены. 
Ответственность — на мне и моей команде”,	ZN.ua,	3	March	2016,	http://
gazeta.zn.ua/internal/artem-sytnik-garantii-nezavisimosti-nabu-v-za-
kone-soblyudeny-otvetstvennost-na-mne-i-moey-komande-_.html
33	 Новый тренд. Частный бизнес осваивает импорт газа из ЕС, Liga.net,	
4	March	2016,	http://biz.liga.net/all/tek/stati/3271195-novyy-trend-chast-
nyy-biznes-osvaivaet-import-gaza-iz-es.htm



























































III. The De-OlIgARChISATION ThAT NeveR 
hAppeNeD 
Several	weeks	 before	he	 stepped	down	as	 prime	minister,	Ar-





















The	 post-Maidan	 oligarchic	 system	 is	 mainly	 characterised	 by	
a	 tactical	 alliance	 between	 the	major	 ‘old’	 oligarchs	 and	 either	
President	Poroshenko’s	camp	or	the	group	of	Arseniy	Yatsenyuk,	
i.e.	 the	 two	strongest	centres	of	political	power	 in	Ukraine.	The	
oligarchs	Dmytro	Firtash	and	Serhiy	Lyovochkin	are	among	those	
who	have	built	up	close	relations	with	the	president’s	circle,	while	
35	 Усі антикорупційні органи повинні нещадно боротися з політичною ко-
















Ihor	 Kolomoyskyi	 and	 Rinat	 Akhmetov	 have	 associated	 them-
selves	with	Yatsenyuk’s	circle.	This	alliance	benefits	both	sides.	










As	 in	 the	 previous	 period,	 after	 the	 revolution	 the	 oligarchs	
again	 started	 exploiting	 their	 advantage	 over	 the	 politicians.	
In	 a	poorly	managed	 state	with	 an	 ineffective	 and	 corrupt	bu-




the	Ukrainian	media	market.	Yet	 in	order	 to	ensure	 that	 their	
businesses	are	protected,	the	oligarchic	groups	constantly	need	
to	use	tools	only	available	to	state	authorities,	which	means	that	
they	have	had	 to	find	 some	 common	ground	with	 the	political	
leadership.	It	should	be	noted	in	this	context	that	the	oligarchs	
do	not	have	any	constant	allies	among	the	political	parties,	but	
instead,	 enter	 temporary	deals	 that	are	 subject	 to	 revision	de-
pending	 on	what	 is	 needed	 to	 safeguard	 one’s	 interests	 at	 the	
given	moment.
As	a	 result	of	 the	 ‘old’	oligarchs	entering	alliances	with	 the	po-
litical	 camps	 of	 President	 Poroshenko	 and	 Arseniy	 Yatsenyuk	


























This	 bipolar	 arrangement	 survived	 the	 change	 of	 prime	minis-
ters	when	Arseniy	Yatsenyuk	stepped	down	and	was	replaced	by	
Volodymyr	Groysman,	 President	 Poroshenko’s	 trusted	man.	Af-
ter	lengthy	negotiations,	Yatsenyuk	was,	however,	able	to	resign	











a	 statement	by	Groysman	who	said	 that	 “the	 same	rules	 should	








37	 Володимир Гройсман: Якщо прийдуть на обід Коломойський, Ахметов, 













































of	 the	 ‘old’	oligarchs.	The	 former	usually	do	not	own	any	major	
























an,	Ukraine	 found	 itself	 in	a	paradoxical	 situation	–	on	 the	one	
hand,	members	of	the	new	government	are	fully	aware	that	they	
















(for	 example,	 there	 have	 been	 attempts	 at	 delaying	 the	 start	 of	
the	anti-corruption	institutions’	operations,	and	the	introduction	
of	public	financing	of	political	parties	has	been	postponed	until	




























ry,	 the	oligarchs,	who	have	 taken	over	entire	 economic	 sectors,	
have	been	mainly	interested	in	maximising	their	profits	and	have	
cared	 little	 about	 the	 development	 and	 modernisation	 of	 their	
businesses.	 As	 a	 result	 of	 this	 extensive	 and	 anti-development	










influence	 as	 long	as	 the	 current	balance	of	power	 in	Ukrainian	
politics	prevails.	Some	more	or	less	serious	conflicts	may	emerge	
between	 the	government	and	 individual	oligarchs,	but	 this	will	
not	affect	the	system	in	any	significant	way.39	Moreover,	even	if	
a	 snap	election	were	 to	be	held	 in	 the	coming	months,	 it	would	
be	very	unlikely	to	lead	to	a	qualitative	change	in	the	Verkhovna 





oligarchs	and	giving	them	to	other	oligarchs”. Игорь Коломойский: «Я не го-

















and	media	 support	 of	 the	 oligarchic	 groups,	 and	would	have	 to	
put	 the	 oligarchs’	 representatives	 in	 its	 election	 lists	 in	 return.	
In	view	of	the	general	weakness	of	the	state	and	the	other,	previ-
ously	described	 instruments	of	oligarchic	 influence,	 this	means	
that	in	the	foreseeable	future,	the	oligarchs	will	continue	to	act	as	
important	‘stakeholders’	in	Ukrainian	politics,	in	which	they	hold	
a	blocking	package.
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